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[For information pertaining to Soviet policies in the Western Ukraine, particularly in regard to the Uniate Church and collectivization, see 26: Anonymous, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116.]

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

JOHN S. RESHETAR

EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] The

[1] See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Kharlampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Zizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

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The development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

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795 668 adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church. Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council *(Ukrainska Central'na Rada)* which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

795 659 When the government of the Central Council was replaced by that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.[8]

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

[8] Dmytro Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (Uzhorod, 1930), II, 322.

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which met on June 20. Metropolitan Anthony as senior bishop was elected to the honorary presidency of the *Sobor*, but Bishop Pimen of the Balta diocese presided over the sessions. A national church did not emerge from these meetings because its adherents controlled no more than a third of the votes. The *Sobor* contented itself with requesting the Government to recognize Anthony as Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, which meant that it wished to have the parishes in Ukraine remain part of the Russian Orthodox Church. On July 9, it enacted a statute for the provisional administration of the Church in Ukraine which granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the right to confirm the election of the Metropolitan of Kiev, hear complaints directed against him and other Ukrainian bishops, bless the convocation of Ukrainian *sobors*, and be prayed for in the performance of every liturgical office in every Ukrainian parish. In effect, the statute provided for autonomy and not the autocephalous status which the nationalist clergy desired.

The statute also conferred upon Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow the right to reject any of its provisions, and the head of the Russian Church did not hesitate to do so. In a letter written to Metropolitan Anthony on September 26, 1918, the Patriarch expressed his willingness to accept the statute, but only if the Orthodox dioceses in Ukraine were to remain "an inseparable part of the one Russian Orthodox Church" on an autonomous basis, and accept decisions of the All-Russian Church *Sobors*. He also insisted upon the right to send his own representative to Ukrainian *sobors* and confirm the ruling hierarch in every Ukrainian diocese.[4] The Patriarch's conditions were not calculated to endear him to the advocates of a national church. Their dissatisfaction found expression in the address which Hetman Skoropads'kyj's new Minister of Cults, Alexander Lotoc'kyj (1870–1939), delivered before the All-Ukrainian *Sobor* on November 12, when it reconvened in Kiev. In no uncertain terms he attacked the Patriarch's autocratic methods and flatly stated that the Government favored an autocephalous church for Ukraine.

However, the conflict remained unresolved because of the collapse of Hetman Skoropads'kyj's regime as a result of the withdrawal of the German army of occupation in conformity with the armistice provisions which had been negotiated in the West. As the Germans withdrew, the Red Army invaded Ukraine and attacked the newly-organized armed forces of the Directory Government, the troops commanded by Symon Petljura. Many of the members of this new Government which succeeded that of Skoropads'kyj were republican socialists who had been prominent in the Central Council *(Rada)* of 1917. While many of these men were secularists

[4] *Ibid.*; Appendix 11 contains the text of the Patriarch's letter.

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795 659 and opposed to the perpetuation of the close relationship between Church and State which had existed under the Hetman's regime, they nevertheless thought it best to recognize the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and did so in a law enacted on January 2, 1919. In the two years of anarchy and civil war which followed, little could be done to further the actual establishment of the Church. The Directory Government's diplomatic envoy in Constantinople, Alexander Lotoc'kyj, attempted in vain to obtain recognition of the Church by the *locum tenens* of the Constantinople Patriarchate in order to assure its canonical status. Metropolitan Dorofej, who was serving as *locum tenens* at the time, refused to decide on recognition, since he was convinced that only a patriarch could take such a step.[5] Lotoc'kyj's efforts had been hampered in Constantinople by the émigré Russian hierarchs, including Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan Platon of Odessa, who had found refuge there from the Bolsheviks. They ultimately established themselves as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad with headquarters in the Yugoslav city of Sremski-Karlovtsi. Their departure from Ukraine, however, meant that the opposition to the national church would be diminished to a slight degree.

795 Thus in 1920 there commenced to function effectively in Kiev an All-Ukrainian Church Council which was a synod composed of priests and deacons. It had the task of promoting the organization of parishes for the new Church and also served as its highest administrative organ. The Russian bishops whom Metropolitan Anthony had left in charge prior to his departure expressed their opposition to this Ukrainian "sectarianism" and forbade the members of the Ukrainian Church Council to celebrate the liturgy. However, the new Church retained control of four of the largest houses of worship in Kiev, including historic St. Sophia's Cathedral, and held the usual Eastern Orthodox religious offices, but conducted them in the Ukrainian language instead of in the archaic and not easily understood Church Slavonic which is the liturgical medium of the Russian Church. Other parishes left the Russian Church and attached themselves to the Ukrainian Church Council, and it soon became evident that this new branch of Eastern Orthodoxy would have to obtain its own episcopate. No bishop of the Russian Church was willing to join the Ukrainians, and when they requested several of them to consecrate two Ukrainian priests as bishops they met with refusals. It was in such an atmosphere of frustration that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor* convened in the Cathedral of St. Sophia on October 14, 1921.

The *Sobor*, in a final, futile attempt to seek a reconciliation with

[5] Alexander Lotoc'kyj, *V. Carborodi* (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 92 f.

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795 the Russians, invited Metropolitan Michael (Jermakov), the Patriarch's exarch in Ukraine, to attend its sessions, but he countered by declaring it uncanonical. Thus the Ukrainians had no alternative but to establish a hierarchy by consecrating their own metropolitan. Such a consecration has generally been regarded as invalid since it is not effected by means of the "laying on of hands" by at least two bishops and is said to constitute disruption of the Apostolic Succession. Despite this the *Sobor* proceeded to elect the Very Reverend Basil Lypkivs'kyj (1864–1938) as "Metropolitan of Kiev and the whole Ukraine," and arranged a unique form of conciliar consecration, which was performed in St. Sophia's on Sunday, October 23. The Metropolitan-elect was surrounded by a number of priests who laid their hands upon his head; the worshipers who filled the cathedral placed their hands upon one another's shoulders and those who stood immediately behind the consecrating priests touched their robed shoulders. In all other respects the consecration was Orthodox in form. The bishops whom Lypkivs'kyj consecrated after assuming his office had their status challenged by the various Orthodox national churches which also refused to accept the Metropolitan's consecration as canonical.[6]

795 This did not prevent the Ukrainian Church from ordaining
793 priests, acquiring additional parishes, and pursuing its program of reformed Orthodoxy. The new Church departed from tradition in permitting clergymen to appear in public wearing nonclerical dress when not performing ceremonial duties. Similarly it allowed them to cut their hair and not grow beards, although Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj retained the appearance of a bishop of the old school. Bishops were permitted to live in the married state, and Lypkivs'kyj himself and all but a few of the persons whom he consecrated continued to live with their wives—a practice which the Orthodox Church does not condone. A bachelor consecrated as a bishop could marry, and priests (and presumably bishops) were allowed to divorce their wives and marry a second time.[7] The practice of allow-

[6] The Russian Church branded this whole procedure as "self-consecration" (*samosvjastvo*) and regarded all priests who were ordained by these hierarchs as apostates, and the sacraments performed by them as invalid and blasphemous. See the brief and biased account of the establishment of the Ukrainian Church in Nicholas Briančaninov, *The Russian Church* (New York, n. d.), pp. 159 ff. Reverend Lypkivs'kyj's ordination into the priesthood had been canonical because he had served as a priest in the Russian Church since 1891 following his graduation from the Kiev Theological Academy. He had demonstrated ability at an early date, and in 1903 he was appointed to the directorship of an ecclesiastical normal school in Kiev. He was removed from this post because of his enthusiasm for the 1905 Revolution; he then accepted a pastorate in a Kiev suburb which he held until he assumed the leadership of the movement for a national church.

[7] See *Dijannja Vseukraïns'koho Pravoslavnoho Cerkovnoho Soboru v Kyjevi 1921 roku* (Frankfurt am Main, 1946), pp. 14 f.

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795 ing bishops to be married at all resulted from a reaction which was
793 general in Russia at the time amongst the "white" or married secular clergy against the monopoly which the "black" or celibate regular clergy held on practically all of the episcopal offices. The canons enacted at the 1921 *Sobor* specifically denied the regular clergy any privileges in obtaining bishoprics.

795 Liberalism also made itself felt in the administration of the Ukrainian Church, which was based on the principle of *sobornopravnist'*, a conciliar and democratic form of ecclesiastical government in which all members of the Church—bishops, priests, and lay representatives—participate co-equally in all of its organs. The *Sobor* of 1921 specifically denied that hierarchs meeting alone could represent the whole Orthodox Ukrainian population. It declared that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor*, which was to meet at least once every five years, "possesses the highest religious, legislative, executive, judicial, and supervisory authority in the Ukrainian Church."[8] In the periods between *sobors* a smaller body, the Church Council, met semi-annually to serve as the highest executive organ and as an interim legislative body for the Church. Part of the Council met on a monthly basis to deal with more immediate matters. On the diocesan and district levels popular assemblies were to operate and each of the former was to elect its own bishop; the elective principle was also to prevail in the individual parishes, the members of which were empowered to select their own pastors with the consent of the diocesan council, a body elected by the diocesan assembly.

771 Another characteristic of the Ukrainian Church was its sense of
795 social consciousness, although expressed within a national context. The canons declared that "who utilizes Church life for social, national, political or personal subjugation should be excommunicated from the Church."[9] They specifically condemned all who employed national sentiments in order to renew the rule of the wealthy classes of society. The Russian Church was charged with having betrayed Orthodoxy *(Pravoslavje)* and having become a bulwark of *caroslavje* and *panoslavje*—glorification of tsars and landowners. In this way the new Church attempted to find a place for itself in the new revolutionary order and gain widespread popular support.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 9. For French translations of some of the documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church see "L'Église Orthodoxe Panukrainienne créée en 1921 à Kiev," *Orientalia Christiana*, No. 3 (June, 1923), pp. 73 ff.

[10] The Ukrainian Church was not unique as a reformed group in the Russia of this period. A similar movement arose within the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the "Renovated" or "Living" Church which also endeavored to break the monopoly of the monastic clergy on episcopal offices by permitting bishops to

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795 This was not an easy task, although by March of 1923 the Church had more than three thousand parishes. These were cared for by priests who were ordained by the new Ukrainian hierarchy, since the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary clergymen who were with the Russian Church in Ukraine remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and refused to join the new Church. During the spring of 1922 the Ukrainians, conscious of their *de facto* status, attempted in vain to effect a reconciliation with the other Orthodox churches and obtain recognition by inviting them to send delegates to a meeting in Kiev for the purpose of creating a league of Orthodox churches. The other churches refused to establish any contacts with a group which they regarded as having violated the canons of the Church, which require no less than two hierarchs to consecrate a bishop. Faced with such formidable opposition, the Ukrainian Church had no alternative but to attempt to pursue an independent course. However, before it could do so it needed a rationale for its method of consecration. This was provided by the Most Reverend John Teodorovyč, then Bishop of Vinnica and now Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in the form of a disquisition on the Grace of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church; he wrote it during the autumn of 1922.

779 795 713 The Grace of the Holy Spirit, according to Orthodox dogma, is the divine power which is necessary for salvation and which resides in the Church and is dispensed by it through the sacraments.[11] The dispute between the Ukrainian Church and the other Orthodox national churches resulted from contrary views regarding the role which should be granted to tradition as a source of divine knowledge. Archbishop Teodorovyč bases his argument largely on Scriptural writings and contends that the hierarchy or institution of the pastorate in the primary Church, which was established by Christ, was the Apostolate. This body of men, it is claimed, was not above or outside of the Church but was of the Church since Christ "called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles" (Luke 6:13). Thus the Apostolate, it is argued, could not have been anterior to the Church, nor could it have created the Church, because Christ founded both and selected the Apostolate from the Church.[12]

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marry. It allowed clergymen to cut their hair and shave their beards and for a brief period in the mid-twenties preached the sinfulness of capitalism and temporarily won the support of the Soviet Government which hoped in this way to weaken the Moscow Patriarchate and the traditional Church.

[11] Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (Milwaukee, 1923), p. 219.

[12] Archbishop John Teodorovyč, *Blahodatnist' Jerarkhiï Ukraïns'koï Avtokefalnoï Cerkvy*, 3rd ed. (Regensburg, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

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779 The act of conciliar consecration performed in Kiev in October
795 of 1921 is justified on the grounds that the Ukrainian Church,
793 although without its own bishops while under Muscovite domination from 1686 to 1921, never lost its Grace. Consecration is a bestowal of Grace which is a gift of God not subject to human control; what is granted by God, it is reasoned, cannot be withheld by any individual who has the task of laying on hands. Bishops alone did not at all times enjoy a monopoly of the right to consecrate since such a doctrine would exclude God who is the sole consecrator. The election of Reverend Lypkivs'kyj as Metropolitan was not a renewal of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church but rather a renewal of the traditional fullness of its structure. The Ukrainian Church continued to possess Grace even when its bishops were being appointed by Moscow. The *Sobor* of 1921, it is contended, merely renewed the function of the episcopacy; prior to that time the Church possessed pastors who were abiding by the instructions which Christ gave to teach and baptize. Apostolic Succession, it is argued, was preserved during the 1686–1921 period in the whole institution of the pastorate in Ukraine and not in the episcopacy alone since it is but one part of the whole hierarchy.

This contention is based on the assumption that the bishops alone cannot be identified with the Apostles since in the primary Church the terms "presbyter" or elder and "bishop" were apparently employed interchangeably in referring to the Apostles. The distinction in rank between the episcopacy and the priesthood, it is argued, was developed later by man. Thus the institution of the pastorate, which includes priests as well as bishops, proceeds from the Apostolate established by Christ. By this logic priests must be regarded as successors of the Apostles no less than bishops are since all of the Apostles were equal in the Grace which they enjoyed. As proof of this, Archbishop Teodorovyč cites Peter's reference to himself as an elder or presbyter (I Peter 5:1) together with Paul's Epistle to Titus; in the latter (Titus 1:5–6), qualifications for elders are laid down and without any apparent interruption in the train of thought the term "bishop" is then substituted for "elder" in the following verse indicating that the two terms were synonymous in the primary Church.[18] A bishop did not and does not enjoy a greater degree of Grace than did a presbyter (elder) or priest since the Grace which Christ bestowed upon the Apostles was of a uniform quality. Mortals cannot attempt to measure Grace. There is no evidence, says Archbishop Teodorovyč, to indicate that the sacrament of holy orders, which is now performed exclusively by bishops, is

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. Also see Paul's Epistle to the Philippians 1:1.

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of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukraïny*). This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

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795 659 687 of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

793 795 The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraina Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

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1920's. However, Archbishop Polikarp had placed himself under the Moscow Patriarchate in 1939 when his diocese was incorporated into the Soviet Union; he now had to bear the onus of disobeying Moscow and in May of 1942 was divested of all sacerdotal position *in absentia*. This did not prevent him from proceeding with the organization of the autocephalous church, although a rival movement for mere autonomy headed by Archbishop Alexei Hromads'kyj served to weaken the effort. When the Nazis retreated from Ukraine, Archbishop Polikarp and eleven other hierarchs obtained refuge in Germany with thousands of other Ukrainian displaced persons.

Two attempts in as many decades to establish an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union have ended in failure with the believers reintegrated into the Russian Church on both occasions. The attempts, although abortive, were made possible by the vague unity of Eastern Orthodoxy which is not organized on the monarchical model. No patriarch is regarded as the head of the whole Church, for this distinction belongs exclusively to Christ (Ephesians 2:20, 5:23; I Corinthians 3:11). What unity the Church possesses is reflected not in its external organization but in the whole episcopacy in accordance with the principle of harmony and corporateness which is *Sobornost*. The autocephalous units of the Church agree on dogma, recognize each other's sacraments as valid, and engage in concelebrations of the liturgy on occasions of great importance. Yet once the principle of autocephaly is accepted it is only logical that there be as many distinct churches, albeit of the same confession, as there are nations and that the boundaries of religious and political jurisdictions coincide. It is a principle which, in the last analysis, leads to a limitation of the universality of Eastern Orthodoxy, since it isolates the various branches of the Church, spelling death to the notion of effective organic unity.

175 Grand Princes of Kyiv, i. e. the leaders of the Norman Vikings should fetch their Christian faith from Byzantium and we are probably right in maintaining that any other state in the same circumstances would also have been christianised from Byzantium.

175 797 The new religion was at first embraced only by the Princes and their courts, but later it was forced on the people by their superiors and became a bond that united the entire state organism. There was no fear that the people would make a combined and successful stand against Christianity for there was no pagan order of priests to take over leadership in such a contest. The people had only sorcerers in place of priests and so it was possible to christianise the country by peaceful methods though pagan ideas continued to live in popular consciousness for a considerable time. It is quite legitimate therefore, to speak at this time of a "double faith".

175 792 ●795 The organisation of the church in the Kyiv empire came from Byzantium which was also the home of the higher clergy with the exception of two cases when representatives of the native population were consecrated metropolitans. The conventual orders and the many monasteries, among which the Cave Monastery in Kyiv attained a great reputation throughout the world of orthodoxy, attempted to shape the lives of the people on Christian lines and to realise the ideals of Christianity. The monasteries were the most important and indeed the only centers of cultural life at that time.

175 795 The Tatars who raided Europe in the 13th century destroyed the Kyiv empire and then pushed further west though they were brought to a halt in the battle of Liegnitz in 1241. Nevertheless for centuries the countries of Eastern Europe had to submit to the yoke of East Asiatic nomads.

In the Mongolian era the position of the church was not exactly unfavorable, for the Khans allowed it a certain freedom and state protection. The metropolitans had, however, to fetch the written pardons (Jarlyks) from the horde personally which was a voluntary acknowledgement of their dependence on the secular power. The dignitaries of the orthodox church continued, it is true, to be consecrated by Constantinople, but no longer

directly but on the mediation and the recommendation of the Khans. 175 795

In the course of the 14th century after their liberation from the Tatars Ukrainian areas came under the sovereignty of the rulers of Lithuania and were then slowly absorbed by Poland after the union of that country with Lithuania. The position of the orthodox church in Ukraine which had already been weakened by the inroads of Tatars was further shaken by this political development and by the subjection of the country to an alien sovereign. It was degraded within the Polish republic from its former status as a state church to a factor of cultural life that was merely tolerated. It thereby lost authority as there was no executive power behind it and the general disorganisation and decay increased from year to year.

The southern sphere of Eastern European territory and the Ukrainian church were unmistakably characterised by a predilection for the west, and a spiritual kinship with the culture of Central and Western Europe. Even the Kyiv Grand Princes were plainly inclined to the west and, in spite of the dependence of their church on Byzantium, they contracted marriage unions with the Catholic dynasties of several European countries. The Tatar raids interrupted this movement, but only for a short time; for as soon as Ukrainian territory was absorbed first by the principality of Lithuania and then by the Polish state, it immediately formed contact again with the west. It is true that the orthodox church of Ukraine was subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople up to 1685, but spiritually it was turned towards the west. It remained loyal to its dogmas but fetched its spiritual weapons in its fight for equality from the arsenal of the leaders of the western churches, Catholic and Protestant. The educational institutes which trained for the priesthood in Ukraine borrowed their organisation from the Jesuit Colleges. Latin was the language used and Aristotle, and after him Christian Wolff with his systematic methods, reigned supreme. So it is no wonder that the youth trained in such schools was not suffocated by formalism and was therefore able to assimilate and develop new ideas. It was from this conciliatory

175 spirit that all the movements for union with Rome sprang
●795 which were so characteristic for orthodoxy in Ukraine.

The orthodox church in the south, in Ukraine, followed its own historical development independent of events in the Muscovite state in the north. Up to the middle of the 17th century it was subject to Constantinople but incorporated within the Polish state and fought with unequal weapons for equality within the organism of a foreign state. But when, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow, the "third Rome", became more and more supreme in the ecclesiastical and religious life of Eastern Europe, a dilemma arose for orthodox Ukrainians in Poland; they could either remain loyal to a weak Byzantium, or subject themselves to the new power of Moscow, or they could improve their political position and come into closer contact with the general process of culture in Europe by uniting with Rome. The movement for union was therefore determined not by dogma, but, in the first instance, by political and cultural considerations. The year 1596 finally witnessed the union of part of the orthodox Ukrainians with Rome. For, when faced with the choice between Moscow and Rome, most of the Ukrainian bishops decided in favor of the latter and thus created a split within the orthodox church which was to be of far-reaching consequence for the shaping of political events in Eastern Europe. Thus, since the end of the 16th century there were two church organisations on Ukrainian territory, the orthodox which was able to maintain itself chiefly in western areas and the united, which, in the course of time, developed to be the national church of Ukraine. With the increasing political importance of the Cossacks throughout the 17th century, the orthodox church tried to rise again and succeeded, above all in the province of culture, in creating new values which ultimately permeated the whole of Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Cossack state and the incorporation of the most of Ukraine in the Russian Empire in the course of the 18th century, the united church was more and more persecuted and in 1838 was finally banned; the Ukrainian orthodox church, on the other hand, fell increasingly under Russian influence. This process gained in intensity with time so that at the beginning of the 20th century the orthodox church

in Ukraine was one of the most powerful instruments for "freeing" the population from national sentiments. After the establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1918, the orthodox church in Ukraine experienced a fresh, if shortlived, renaissance. It could not last long for, when the bolshevists gained the upper hand, the entire religious life of Ukraine suffered the same treatment as that in other parts of the Soviet Union. In the first years of the Soviet regime when the pressure of the government was bearable, orthodox Ukrainians in Soviet Russia organised themselves into the Ukrainian Independent Church, replacing the Old Slavonic church language by the modern mother-tongue. But when the new order in Eastern Europe grew stronger and all religion was banned from public life, the Ukrainian Independent Church had to cease functioning at home and confined its activity to the numerous circles of emigrants who, especially after World War I, sojourned in western countries.

As already mentioned, the orthodox church in Western Ukraine, in areas like Galicia and Volynia, held its own against the Union. But at the beginning of the 18th century these sections were also won for the idea of the union, which was finally stronger here than anywhere. For, even in the days of Polish supremacy, and still more after the occupation of this area by Austria, the United or Greek-Catholic church developed into a Ukrainian national church which protected the people on the one hand from Russian, and on the other from Polish influence. In the 20th century Count Andreas Sheptytskyj, the Lviv metropolitan of this church, who accomplished much not only as the supreme head of the church but just as much as a national leader, became the symbol of the church's wide-spread significance. So it is no wonder but a procedure of accepted political expediency that, even during the First World War the Russian Gov[illegible]nment, rightly seeing in the Greek-Catholic church a cent[illegible] of Ukrainian nationalism, arrested the Metropolitan Sheptytskyj immediately after the occupation of Lviv and sent him into exile. Similarly, the report which appeared last year in all newspapers that the several million members of the United Church had submitted to the Patriarch of Moscow after the country was occupied by bolshevist troops and had thus returned

175 to the bosom of orthodoxy, was in the same category. That
●795 this did not happen voluntarily but was carried out by means of pressure from above is as certain as the fact that it was not religious and dogmatic consideration but solely political factors that were the motive forces behind this change of front from west to east.

had been known earlier in Western Ukraine as a privilege of the towns (Volodymyr from 1324 and Syanik from 1339) becomes the basis of organisation for further settlements in newly acquired areas. German artisans and artists are welcome to these areas and the youth of Ukraine are fired with enthusiasm to attend German and Italian universities in order to acquire learning with which they will subsequently enrich life at home. Thus western cultural movements like Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation penetrated at long length the wide-flung steppe. It is true that they sometimes caused effects there that could not have been expected from experience in other countries. This is seen best in the case of the Reformation. 175 177

After the amalgamation of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state with Poland, the Orthodox Church, though already shaken to its foundations, begins to play an important part in public life; after the loss of Ukrainian independence, it becomes a rallying point for national feeling and the difference in creed between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches coincides with the political difference between Poles and Ukrainians; it was therefore natural that nationalist circles should be absolutely opposed to every further attempt to weaken the Ukrainian Church. It was well known that grievous abuses had crept into the organisation and life of the Orthodox Church, for those abuses arose from the new position it had been forced to assume. From having been an all-powerful state church it was degraded to become a factor in a strange country that was barely tolerated and was therefore unable to control its own administration, all the more as it had no longer a decisive say in making church appointments. It was common property that Orthodoxy in Ukraine was in a critically weak condition of disintegration, but nobody dreamt of opposing it and still less of replacing it by another creed, its fall would have been a severe, if not fatal blow to the entire life of the nation. 795

Such were the psychological reasons for the fact that the reformation movement found such a weak echo in Ukraine, though the necessity for a change in conditions, for reform, but from within, was felt by all.

659 795 The spread of Protestantism from Germany to Ukraine was favored by the mere geographical fact of the latter's inclusion in the Polish empire while Poland, as a result of its close connections with Prussia, the Baltic States and Bohemia was for a considerable time a refuge for all sorts of creeds. Moreover, many of the magnates and some of the kings of Poland had shown themselves to be favorably disposed to the new movement, not indeed from any genuine, religious feeling, nor because they were moved by conscience to adopt new ways, but purely from motives of self-interest; for they calculated that, if the reformation was victorious in Poland, the Catholic Church would forfeit its all-powerful influence on life in general and, further, they hoped to acquire for themselves the enormous property which the Catholic Church would have to abandon. Such reasoning, however, did not apply to the Orthodox Church which had little property and which did not constitute a power that was ambitious of yielding political influence; it was inspired by no desire for sovereignty, but, on the contrary, had constantly to defend itself against encroachments from without.

795 The same trends and sympathy for the West gave rise to the movement for the union of the churches whose leaders did not think only of their personal interest but were also inspired by lofty ideals. When, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow or the third Rome, as it liked to be called, tried to succeed to the position of capital of the Eastern Church, the Ukrainian bishops were faced with a choice between a Moscow that they held to be still uncivilised and Rome, a center of Western culture, and they decided in favor of the latter.

From the point of view of national interests, the dignitaries who joined the Union represented definitely Ukrainian tendencies in contrast to their conservative colleagues who preferred a connection with Moscow which was also orthodox. In support of this contention we may mention that the Metropolitan Hipatius Potij, a Greek Catholic who was one of the most energetic champions of the Union, displayed particular zeal for the Ukrainian language in which tongue he recited his creed and took his oath to the Pope, although he was completely at home in Latin. By accepting the protection of the mighty Church

of Rome as the supreme head of their church, the pioneers of 795
the Union and of the cultural independence of Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, thinking that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles once the churches were united. The course of events has showed how much they were mistaken; for the Poles have merely exploited this rapprochement in ecclesiastical affairs as an instrument by means of which, with the help of the Jesuits, they aimed at ruling over the entire East and at completely absorbing the Ukrainian nation.

Western influence can also be detected in the guild-like 441
organisations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lviv 871
Kyiv, Lutsk etc., organisations which, in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was the foundation of schools which taught Latin as well as Church Slavonic and Greek.

The most important foundation of those so-called Bro- 874
therhood schools was undoubtedly the Kyiv Academy 795
which owed its supremacy as an intellectual center, not 177
only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe .79
to the activities of such an eminent personality as Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Mohyla, the son of the governor of Moldavia and educated in Jesuit schools, remained a life-long advocate of western culture and the Catholic Church. the organisation of which served him as a model when he was planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic principles and methods into the organisation of the Orthodox Church which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. And yet this unique plan succeeded and could succeed only in Ukraine. for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed towards the West. as was clearly expressed in his innovations: in dogma. however. he remained a loyal disciple of the "faith

874 of his fathers", of the Orthodoxy. He is thus a concrete symbol
795 of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete
union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of
177 the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of
.79 the Roman Catholic Church.

795 The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of
874 scholars, writers, politicians and organisers graduated in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma mater", the Kyiv Academy, equipped with the modern weapons of western learning, to fight first of all for the independence and the honor of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kyiv the Ukrainian patriots of that time go to Germany to appropriate the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism, they penetrate to Rome and do not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only in order to become better acquainted with their opponent's plans in the very center of his camp. On their return home they develop an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well educated priests for the fight. In order to supply their audiences with intellectual munition, they publish a series of pamphlets directed against the enemy and all manner of apologies in defence of their own cause, utilising the knowledge they had gathered in the West. This leads to an enormous outburst of polemic writing, to an intellectual activity in the country which strikes even foreigners.

177 But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
814 who had been trained in the West, did not stop there; they performed a still more important function in making European influence supreme in the state of Moscow, or the Russia of Peter, as it was then called. Ukraine contributed no mean share to the work of Peter the Great. The foundation and building of the modern Russian Empire was the almost unaided work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for the intellectual conditions for the solving of this task were almost completely lacking in Moscow itself. In order to carry out his reforms which soon degenerated into an absolute mania for reform, Peter utilised

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

The Soviet Religious Policy

000 In any discussion of Soviet Russian-Ukrainian relations, the religious problem is important for it touches many issues which are but dimly understood in the Western world. The latter has been too long content to think of the east of Europe only in terms of power politics, the Eastern Question, and similar problems to bother about the details of a discussion which has been often a matter of life and death to the people involved and which might throw a real light upon the present situation.

●795 659 One fact stands out. Rus'-Ukraine was Christianized before the division of the Eastern and Western Churches and the full results of that division were not made evident until the dawn of the modern era. The dominant religious type of religion was that of the Orthodox East and the important See was that of Kiev. Yet Kievan Christianity was never bigoted or exclusive and even after the great Schism of 1054, the princes of Kiev continued to intermarry equally with the noble families of both east and west.

After the Metropolitan, under political pressure, took up his residence in Moscow, Kiev and the Western Ukrainian lands secured a new Metropolitan from the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moscow became the seat of a patriarchate but it was only in 1648 that the Patriarch and the Tsar of Moscow became willing to have any contact with the Orthodox Christians of Kiev. Already in 1596 this attitude had culminated in the establishment of a Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, acknowledging the papacy but maintaining the Eastern Orthodox forms of worship.

In 1686, while the Tsar of Russia was beginning to absorb the Zaporozhian Kozaks, he exerted pressure upon the Patriarch of Constantinople to abolish this new Metropolitanate of Kiev, and in 1686, by the act of Moscow but not of Constantinople, this was done. Once Moscow secured control, it applied the

795 659 Muscovite usages and as its power grew in Ukraine, so did its pretensions. The cultural power of Ukrainian Orthodoxy disappeared in the Russian Sea, while the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite became the dominating religious power in Western Ukraine. Nothing shows more clearly the Muscovite attitude than the fact that it gave a lower rank to the Metropolitan of Kiev than it did to the head of the Georgian Orthodox, when they, too, passed under Russian sovereignty.

As Rus'-Ukraine under tsarist control became only a collection of "Little Russian" gubernias, so the Ukrainian Orthodox became a collection of "Little Russian" diocess, in which there was nothing Ukrainian and so it remained until 1917, while each time that the tsar acquired more Ukrainian lands, the same form of coercion was applied not only to the Ukrainian Orthodox but also to the Catholics whose Byzantine Rite under the Hapsburgs and then under Poland and Czechoslovakia, had developed into a distinct Western Ukrainian religion. Under the leadership of Metropolitan Andry Sheptytsky, a giant physically and intellectually, this process went on rapidly, much to the annoyance of the Poles in the old province of Eastern Galicia.

Finally we must note that when Western Ukraine passed under Poland in 1920, that country forced the establishment of a Polish Orthodox Church for the several million Ukrainians and Byelorussians who were in the revived state. The language of this was Polish and its organization was adopted to the Polish system as it developed in the revived state.

With these preliminary notes, we can now turn to the relations between the Ukraine and the Soviet Russians.

A. The Orthodox

With the Revolution of 1917 and the revival and development of the independence movement among the Ukrainians, there arose also a demand for the revival of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was stubbornly opposed by the Provisional Government, Patriarch Tikhon and the Russian Orthodox in Ukraine, the same forces that had haggled and debated the develop-

ment of a Ukrainian independent state throughout the period, until the Russian Communists secured control and were able to maintain their assumption of power.

In the first stages, while the Communists still hoped for the success of the world revolution, they emphasized their doctrines of atheism and they stressed the conception that "religion was the opium of the people." At the same time they endeavored to disintegrate the Russian Orthodox Church from within by giving their support to the various schemes of reform as the Living Church, etc. They also gave especial favor to various Protestant bodies, as the Baptists, who sought to introduce their ideas, often with marked success.

It was a crucial period for eastern Europe, for the Western nations and America which had been victorious in World War I were not inclined to cement their victory. No matter what they thought of the Communist regime, Great Britain and the United States were still convinced that the victory of a democratic Russia was a certainty and they refused to take any steps to help the non-Russian peoples who were being over-whelmed by the Soviets, lest it prejudice their future relations with Russia. France, obsessed with the fear of Germany, was seeking to restore a greater Poland which would absorb as much as possible of Ukraine. The memory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk blinded everybody to events as they were taking place.

It was no less critical for the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Allies sympathized with his position but the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against the Treaty of Sèvres produced a situation where the Western powers had to fight or surrender. They wished to do neither and with a certain Bolshevik sympathy for Turkey, the Patriarch was obliged to be cautious, until his hands were in a way freed by the settlement of Lausanne.

Hence the leaders of the movement for a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were in a way powerless to regulate their relations with Orthodoxy as a whole. They had been unable to secure the support and assistance of any Russian bishops. They

795 were turned down in an appeal to the Bulgarian Church and they obtained no response from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

[793] Impressed by the sense of urgency and the justice of their cause, the leaders of the movement held a synod in Kiev on October 11, 1921 and proceeded to elect as bishops Father Vasyl Lypkivsky and Father Nestor Sharayevsky. Then, as they had no bishops available for their consecration, the members of the Sobor laid their hands upon them and consecrated them bishops without the participation of any bishops save relics of the saints preserved in Kiev. Lypkivsky was then made Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and he and his associate soon consecrated some 27 other bishops.

Yet the uncanonical nature of this original action drove a wedge between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the other Orthodox Churches and made certain that it would not later attract any validly consecrated bishops who would regularize the succession. On the other hand, other reforms, as the introduction of Ukrainian into the services in place of the old Church Slavonic, enabled the Russian opponents to classify it with the various movements as the Living Church which the Bolsheviks had fostered in their endeavor to disintegrate the Russian Church from within.

Still later, when the Orthodox in the succession states began to organize and came under the influence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose position had grown less critical with the strengthening of the new Turkey, it was too late for him to extend aid to the Ukrainian Orthodox as he did to those living under Polish rule by the recognition of a Polish Autocephalous Church in 1924. Thus the Ukrainian Orthodox were left almost completely isolated to face alone the atheistic Communist and imperialistic Russian Orthodox pressure.

Metropolitan Lypkivsky showed himself a very competent leader. The number of parishes under his control multiplied rapidly and by 1927 the Church had nearly 3,000 parishes and some 10,600 priests. It was no small achievement to establish and develop this under the harsh conditions of Soviet reality and for several years during the height of the movement of Ukrainization,

the Church flourished and bade fair to restore the traditions of the old Ukrainian Orthodox Church and there were high hopes that sooner or later it would be able to heal the defects in the original consecration. 795 ●

This was not to be, for after the death of the Patriarch Tikhon the power in the Russian Church passed into the hands of the Metropolitan Sergy who showed himself willing to effect such a compromise with Stalin and Communism as might be necessary. His offer was, to a certain degree, accepted and the Soviet regime, without changing its policy of persecuting all religious activity, began to throw a few crumbs of favor to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. Slowly but surely, the various Russian divisions, like the Living Church, slipped back into the general organization, and the Soviets soon grasped the possibilities of using Sergy and the Russian organization as a political weapon in their struggle for world domination. 795 659

Even before the ending of Ukrainization, the Communists began to put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Metropolitan was refused permission to visit the various parishes under his control and to publish journals and other material for his flock. This was followed by more active measures. Metropolitan Lypkivsky was arrested and imprisoned. So were all of the other bishops and by 1930 there was not a single one of the bishops still in Ukraine who was not in prison or dead. The church was broken up and all of its activities stopped, but the spirit that had animated it continued to lie hidden.

When the Germans and the Soviets occupied Poland in 1939, a new possibility was sensed. The so-called Polish Autocephalous Church was composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, with but a few anti-Communist Russians. Even before 1939, some of these Ukrainian clergy and laity had begun to take steps for the Ukrainianizing of the Church, even though they had been forced to introduce Polish into the services. When the storm broke, Russians like Bishop Sava made their way abroad and joined the Russians in exile. Bishop Oleksy (Hromadsky) in Kremyanets and Bishop Polykarp (Sikorsky) in Lutsk were forced 795 [793]

795 to recognize the Moscow organization, which was coming into favor with Stalin because of its increasing subservience to the Soviet regime. On the other hand, Metropolitan Dionysy, who had been in that part of Ukraine that was included in the Polish Government General, now threw off any attempt at concealment and revived the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which this time was provided with canonical orders in all grades. He consecrated two new Ukrainian bishops, Ilarion (O. Ohienko) for Kholm and Podlyasie and Palady (Vedybida-Rudemko) for Krakow and Lemkivshchyna.

This marked a new period and when the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941 and occupied it, Polykarp joined them, while Oleksy set up still another group, the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, for he refused to break his connections with Moscow.

795 659 [727] The German permission for the formation in 1942 of a central organization was frankly ambiguous. On the one hand, they were glad of any movement that would rouse the people against Moscow. On the other, in religion as in politics, they were opposed to any movement which would prevent them from carrying out their policy of treating the Ukrainians as a subject and inferior race. As a result, they put every obstacle in the way of a reconciliation between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups and threw their support to whichever was the weaker in any given area.

The open support of the Soviet government by Sergy and his associates now under the pressure of war paid off. His protestations of sympathy for Stalin and the Russians were rewarded with medals and other honors. Then, in the autumn of 1943, as the final step in the process, Stalin gave permission for the restoration of the Patriarchate in Moscow and Sergy was duly installed. On his death in 1944, he was succeeded by Aleksey, the former Archbishop of Leningrad, the present Patriarch, and under his leadership the Russian Orthodox Church has embarked upon a policy of securing control for the Soviets of all other Orthodox Churches.

795 In the meanwhile, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war displayed great activity in the occupied Ukraine. It speedily won the support of most of the clergy who were not in

the Soviet service. It reopened churches that had been closed by the Soviets and it cooperated with the Ukrainian patriotic movement. 795

With the return of the Soviet forces, the leaders of the Church retired to the west with a large part of the priests, and the others joined the underground. The Ukrainian Church was again suppressed and brought directly under the Patriarch of Moscow and it is to be noted that the head of the Orthodox Church in the UkSSR, does not hold any special point of honor as does the Catholicus of Georgia, who is still recognized as the head of a satellite Church.

It is thus safe to say that despite the continued existence of the UkSSR as an independent nation for the purposes of the United Nations, there is now no distinctive Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It has been swallowed, as in the days of Peter I, by the great Moscow religious imperialism. It has no independence and it is thoroughly and in all points independent upon the Russian Patriarch in Moscow.

B. The Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite

When in 1939 the Soviet forces by their understanding with the Nazis occupied for the first time Eastern Galicia and the Western Ukrainian lands, they at once set to work to remodel the area on their own standards and to eliminate all the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and culture. This process was, however, rudely interrupted by the German attack in 1941.

The dominant religion in the area was the Greek Catholic Uniat Church, or, to be more precise, Catholicism of the Byzantine Rite. The Metropolitan of this Church, Andry Sheptytsky, was the most respected figure in the entire area and he was a religious and cultural leader in every sense of the word. During this first occupation, Archbishop Sheptytsky was not personally disturbed but he was deprived of his liberty and forced into a semi-retirement. His schools and other institutions were closed, the Church was deprived of its property and a considerable number of priests were punished on various charges. Yet there was no general holocaust. 795 793

In 1941, Archbishop Sheptytsky was one of the leading figures

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 659 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his associates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight. 793 661

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property
795 of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for
793 their own use.

661 This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

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III. RETRENCHMENT AND REVOLT

563 By the end of September, 1939, it appeared that Germany had definitely abandoned the Ukrainian nationalists. The agreement which allowed the Soviet Union to occupy the territory of Poland up to the line of the Bug and the San meant in effect that the compact Ukrainian area in Galicia, the Ukrainian land which possessed the strongest nationalist feeling, had passed under the control of the Soviet regime. There remained, however, a few small areas of Ukrainian settlement under German control in what was now designated as the Generalgouvernement Polen. Aside from several minute border districts, these were the Lemko region and the Chelm (Kholm) region. The Lemko area is a rugged stretch on the northern slope of the Carpathians, extending from Przemysl (Peremyshl') almost to Cracow. The majority of its population was a hardy if impoverished group of mountaineers who spoke the Lemko dialect of the Ukrainian language. Under the Polish regime this group had been subjected to the same repression which was exercised against the population of eastern Galicia, but the low economic potential of the area discouraged the Poles from expanding significantly into the hill region.

563 795 In the Chelm district, on the other hand, a violent policy of denationalization had been carried out. This area, which had always contained a mixed population, was further complicated ethnographically by changes in religion. Originally a large part of the population, including the great majority of the Ukrainians, had been Greek Catholic, as were their brothers in Galicia. Under Alexander II, however, a harsh policy of repression had prevailed, the aim of which was the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church and strengthening of the Orthodox Church. Numerous Greek rite parishes were forcibly transferred to the Orthodox Church,

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and a number of Latin rite churches which were accused of ministering to Greek Catholics who resisted transfer to Orthodoxy were also seized.[1] Either because they originally had some sympathy for Orthodoxy, or because they became accustomed to it over the decades, many of the "converted" congregations had retained some ties with it after the area had become a part of Poland. Stimulated by part of the Latin clergy (the Greek Catholic hierarchy opposed the step), the Polish government seized many of the churches or, in some cases, even burnt them to the ground. The Orthodox priests were expelled and replaced by Catholic pastors of the Latin, not the Greek, rite. The small supply of intellectuals made it difficult for other Ukrainian communities to aid the Ukrainians of Chelm, and, as a result, the policy of denationalization had considerable success.[2]

For over twenty months these small and handicapped areas were to serve as the principal territorial base of Ukrainian nationalist efforts. The reason that they were able to fulfill this function arose from the deliberately ambiguous nature of German policy toward the Ukrainian movements during this period. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which was a formal barrier to the use of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment to disrupt the Soviet Union, was, indeed, merely regarded as a truce by the Nazi leaders, but the duration of the truce was viewed as indefinite. Any overt encouragement of the Ukrainian nationalists would be looked upon by the Soviet Union as an unfriendly gesture, if not as preparation for an attack; consequently, Hitler was determined to use extreme caution in dealing with the Ukrainians as long as he felt that amicable relations with the Soviet Union were in his interest.[3] At the same time, the Machiavellian strain in Nazi

[1] Adrien Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie: Leurs Relations Diplomatiques au XIX^e Siecle* (Paris: Editions Spès, 1925), II, 440.

[2] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 335; Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 279*n*; and especially Volodymyr Kubiiovych, "Die ukrainische Volksgruppe," *Das Generalgouvernement*, I (December, 1940), 14–19.

[3] This is shown not only by Hitler's express order to exercise caution in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in order to avoid difficulties with Russia (Memorandum for the files concerning the session of the RVA [Reichsverteidigungsausschuss], Warsaw, March 2, 1940, EC 300; hereafter referred to as EC 300), but also by the fact that even much later he requested Bormann

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such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup*, September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

[Zhitomir in the East Ukraine, 1941 -- Analyst]

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VIII. NATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH

THE PRINCIPAL propagators of Ukrainian nationalism in the occupied Ukraine were political groups. They were, however, not the only bearers of the concept of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Religious organizations also played an important role. The relation of the Greek Catholic Church to the nationalist parties has already been discussed. Unlike the political parties, most of which at least claimed to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, however, the Greek Catholic Church was almost wholly confined to Galicia, since the great mass of the East Ukrainian Christians were members of the Orthodox faith.

In the Orthodox lands, religion and national affiliation have always been closely related. Most of the East and South Slavic peoples identify their church with their national existence. Some of the same characteristics which have enhanced the distinctiveness of these peoples have also formed the basis of divisions among the Orthodox Slavs. One such feature is the lack of a supreme authority within the Orthodox Church. Each body of the church, existing in a given territory in a given period, has a well-defined hierarchy, usually governed by a council of bishops and frequently headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. There is, however, no pope at the head of all Orthodoxy. It is true that the Orthodox Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, recognizes the authority of an ecumenical council, but such a council has not been held in the East for a millennium.

A difficult question arises at this point: how is the "body of the faithful" or "territory" of each group to be defined? This problem has, in fact, been an extremely troublesome one in the history of the Orthodox Church, for in the absence of a central ecclesiastical authority there can be no final solution. In practice an answer has been provided by another characteristic feature

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●795 659 of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a [668] major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood.

795 659 186 Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Russian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. The October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscow, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia.

000 Had the group desiring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the office of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

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659 Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers
795 came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. The leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in I oland.[3] In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius.[4]

795 When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastical organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. The latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.[5]

While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it
[626] did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[4] *UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avtokefalnaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov')* (UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]), by "A. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss, 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1. There was also a Bishop Timothy (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, but he played no role in the controversies which followed, and appears to have been burned to death when Germans destroyed his monastery (Occ E-4 [1]).

[5] Occ E-4 (1); *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

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In order to satisfy the resulting need for clergymen, Alexius is 795
said to have consecrated a large number of new priests, many of them persons unfitted by background or training for the performance of clerical duties.[6] Thus the fabric of the church was to some extent weakened and demoralized. At the same time, however, the Soviet-allied church in Moscow endeavored to extend its influence into an area which had had few Orthodox communicants since the seventeenth century, by consecrating as bishop of L'vov, under the name of Panteleimon, a priest, Rudyk, who was a native Galician but had always favored a union of the province with Russia.[7]

That there was nothing inherently agreeable in their enforced submission to Soviet control is indicated by the fact that the Orthodox bishops in the West Ukraine, both those who had exercised episcopal functions in Volhynia prior to 1939 and those who owed their status to the Moscow-inspired endeavors to reorganize the Ukrainian church, failed to evacuate with the Red Army when the Germans invaded the region. The sole exception was the Exarch Nicholas, who soon assumed an active role in appealing to the patriotic and religious sentiments of the peoples of the USSR to secure support of the Soviet regime. Under the title of Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, he issued numerous statements against the Germans and the Ukrainian nationalists.[8]

As the German armies drove on beyond the pre-1939 Polish border into areas which had been under Soviet control for twenty years, they discovered that there remained considerable numbers of Orthodox clergymen. For example, there were one hundred in the Zhitomir area alone, and two small churches had remained open in Kiev under Soviet rule.[9] There were also Archbishops

[6] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1941, p. 2; Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[7] *UAPTs*, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1941, p. 2.

[8] For a report on clandestine propaganda against the Germans in the Ukraine issued over Nicholas's signature, see PS 051. There are a number of reports of Orthodox priests, especially in Kiev, who acted as Soviet agents (cf. Occ E-4 [1]). One of Nicholas's wartime writings was even distributed abroad by the Soviet Union—i.e., Nikolai (Nicholas), Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia (ed.), *The Russian Orthodox Church and the War against Fascism* (Moscow: The Patriarchate of Moscow, 1943). At a later period, Nikolai frequently employed the title Mitropolit Krutitskii, pertaining to the Moscow monastery of which he was titular head.

[9] PS 053.

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795 Anthony (Abashidze) in Kiev, who was, however, too old and crippled to exercise any considerable degree of influence; Anatole in Odessa; Theophilus in Kharkov; and Bishop Damaskin in Kamenets-Podols'k.[10]

As soon as conditions had become somewhat stabilized in the West Ukrainian lands, Alexius and his associates proceeded to call a meeting of all Ukrainian bishops in areas liberated from the Soviet regime. This gathering, known as the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops, met in the Pochaïvs'ka Lavra in mid-August, 1941, and on August 18 proclaimed the reorganization of the Autonomous Orthodox Church in the Ukraine.[11] Subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow was declared to be in abeyance so long as the Communists maintained control over him, but a nominal canonical adherence of the Ukrainian church to the Patriarch was recognized. At the same time, two new bishops were consecrated to carry out the task of reorganizing church life.[12]

This task was already under way, at least in the Zhitomir area. All surviving priests were registered and their status examined by two archimandrites (monastic archpriests), one sent by Alexius and one from the famous Monastery of the Caves in Kiev.[13] The great majority of the surviving clergy had been consecrated in the old canonically recognized Russian church, since Soviet persecution had greatly reduced the Autocephalous ranks. Some of the latter remained, however, and had to accept reconsecration at the hands of the bishops of the Volhynian Sobor before receiving appointments to parishes. Understandably, this demand for repudiation of the position on the validity of the Autocephalous consecration taken by their deceased leader, Lypkivs'kyi, was deeply resented, especially since many of the priests previously consecrated by Alexius were not, as has been pointed out, models of devotion to the sacerdotal vocation.[14]

[10] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[11] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[12] *UAPTs*, p. 3, names eight appointed at this time. Contemporary sources refer to two only, and it appears likely that the others were consecrated somewhat later, probably for the most part at the *sobor* in December. Cf. *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3, and *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1941, p. 1.

[13] Fedir S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 4; the archimandrite from Kiev, Leontius Fillippovych, was consecrated bishop (as Leontius) at the August *sobor*.

[14] *Ibid.*

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Whether the greatly weakened "Lypkivites," as the Autocephalous adherents were known, could have made any effective objections by themselves is doubtful. There was, however, a powerful ally at hand. During the time when the Soviet authorities were bringing the Volhynian church under their control, Ukrainian influence in Orthodox ecclesiastical life in the Generalgouvernement was greatly increasing, particularly in the Chelm area. As part of the restoration of the Orthodox Church to a position of strength, Dionysius, in October, 1940, consecrated Professor John Ohiienko, who had long been active in religious affairs as a church historian and philologist, as Hilarion, Archbishop of Chelm.[15] Two months later he consecrated a bishop, Palladius, for the small Orthodox population in the Lemko region.[16] Both of these men were strong nationalists. Hilarion in particular had long desired to see the separation of the Ukrainian church from Moscow.[17]

When the Volhynian Sobor was called, Alexander, the archbishop of Pinsk, was not invited, for, it was explained, he was a Belorussian.[18] Nevertheless, his Moscow-appointed successor, Benjamin, was not only present but acted as secretary of the conference. In view of the fact that Alexander's opposition to the Communists had been the cause for Benjamin's appointment, it is understandable that this arrangement excited discontent. Moreover, the position of Dionysius, who had been the superior of all the Volhynian bishops before the Soviet occupation, was unclear.[19] If Soviet occupation of Volhynia had been illegitimate, presumably his authority had only been suspended by physical barrier of the frontier which had separated German-controlled Warsaw from Soviet-occupied territory. Nevertheless, after Soviet evacuation, Alexius had proceeded to reorganize the whole Ukrainian church on the assumption that a reunion with Moscow had been legally constituted, although publicly holding the posi-

[15] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 24, 1940, p. 1.

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 12, 1941, p. 3. Palladius became bishop of Cracow; this move was viewed by some as an unwarranted invasion by the Orthodox Church of a predominantly Greek Catholic section of the Ukrainian territory. Cf. Mykola Andrusiak in *Nastup*, October 12, 1940, p. 4.

[17] Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 17, 1942, p. 3.

[18] *UAPTs*, p. 3; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3, expresses the indignation felt at the exclusion of the Autocephalous bishops in the Generalgouvernement.

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tion that this union was inoperative because of continued Soviet control of the church in Moscow. Doubtless influenced by these considerations, Polykarp, the bishop of Lutsk, declined to attend the *sobor*, presenting the excuse of "difficult conditions of communication," although his episcopal see was less than fifty miles from the Pochaïvs'ka Lavra.[20] Shortly afterwards Dionysius appointed Polykarp "vicar" of the Vladimir Volynsk and adjacent Gorukhov (Horukhiv) areas; at the time, apparently neither explicitly rejected Alexius as head of the Orthodox hierarchy in Volhynia.[21]

During the fall of 1941, opposition to Alexius's predominance gradually mounted. In addition to the friction over the investiture of the Lypkivite priests, great resentment arose from the fact that the bishops of Alexius's group were either predominantly of Russian origin or were known for past adherence to the church of Moscow. The acceptance of continued subordination to Moscow, however theoretical the tie might be under the prevailing conditions, was of course resented by the Ukrainian nationalist elements. Moreover, many among the latter, especially the intelligentsia, strongly desired the replacement of the Old Slavonic liturgy by services in the living Ukrainian language, while the Volhynian *sobor* had merely provided for certain prayers in the latter speech.[22] As these points of friction accumulated, prominent Orthodox laymen like Stephen Skrypnyk, the publisher of the newspaper *Volyn'* in Rovno, rallied to the side of the Autocephalous group.[23] On November 28, Polykarp definitely broke with Alexius, declaring the Archbishop's group "anarchical," and repudiated him as ecclesiastical superior.[24] Shortly afterwards, Alexius replied by proclaiming himself Metropolitan of the Ukraine, in accordance with a decision of a second *sobor* of Volhynian bishops.[25]

[20] *UAPTs*, p. 3; *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[21] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist*, November 15, 1941, p. 3. In a move evidently designed to conciliate Polykarp, the *sobor* had named him bishop of Kamenets-Podolsk (*ibid.*).

[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[23] Cf. Skrypnyk's article in *Volyn'*, reproduced in *L'vivs'ki Visti*, January 11–12, 1942, p. 5, and an article from the Kremenets *Kremianets'kyi Visnyk*, cited in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[24] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, January 11–12, 1942, p. 5 (Skrypnyk's article cited).

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

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While the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was splitting into two antagonistic factions, the leader of the Greek Catholic Church was endeavoring to effect an ecclesiastical union of all Ukrainians. The separate development of the Greek Catholic Church has been sketched already. It may be pointed out, however, that what had originally been regarded as an instrument of the Poles for consolidating their dominion in the western Ukrainian lands had long since developed into a truly national church, in the sense of being independent of any foreign secular power, although it was largely confined to one province of the Ukraine. Since the Greek Catholic Church of the Ukraine possessed a rite and a body of ecclesiastical regulations quite different from that of the churches of the neighboring Catholic nations, which were of the Latin rite, the mere fact of adherence to it tended to set the Galicians apart as a national entity. As was pointed out, Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi had long been a vigorous supporter of the Ukrainian nationalist movements, although he had tried to turn them away from an extreme nationalism incompatible with Christianity. His influence was naturally greatest among his own coreligionists, but extended also to Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith. Hence Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi felt that the Soviet retreat offered an opportunity for bringing about the union of all Ukrainians in a single national church within the framework of the universal church in which he believed. The immediate opportunity for advancing this desire was a letter, October 21, 1941, to Archbishop Hilarion, congratulating him on his elevation to the episcopacy; Sheptyts'kyi explained that he could not do so before because of the severance of communications between the Soviet- and the German-dominated areas. Together with cordial felicitations, the Metropolitan expressed his hope that Hilarion would play a leading role in cleansing the Ukrainian church of "uncanonical" "Muscovite" influences introduced by Peter the Great, and hoped that this process would prepare the way for union of all the Ukrainian churches.[26] Two months later he addressed a

[26] The text of the letter is printed in Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 123–24.

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795 letter of similar import to all "Orthodox archpriests in the Ukraine and in the Ukrainian lands." [27]

The replies were courteous, but not encouraging. Hilarion answered in a cordial, even humble fashion, but he did not fail to point out that, while the liturgy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had indeed suffered from Russian infiltration, that of the Greek Catholic Church had been permeated with Latin elements, and he suggested that the latter body also needed purification from foreign influences.[28] Alexius likewise replied to the second letter in a friendly fashion, but said that unification could come about only through a change in human nature, perhaps at the end of the world, and expressed the view that, after all, diversity had its advantages in promoting the search for the good.[29] Still not giving up hope, Sheptyts'kyi appealed in an open letter of March 3, 1942, for the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox intelligentsia, who, he said, exerted great influence in their church.[30] This effort was also fruitless. Probably its only result was to play a part in inducing the Autocephalous Church in the Generalgouvernement to present a final reply to his overtures by an uncompromising resolution of the *sobor* of bishops in Warsaw, in May, 1942, to the effect that his wishes could easily be fulfilled, if only all Greek Catholics would join the Autocephalous Church.[31]

000 The failure of the Metropolitan's efforts was doubtless due fundamentally to the deep cleavage which separates Orthodox from Catholic, the former viewing submission to the authority of the Pope as a renunciation of the valid tradition of the Christian church, which they believe that their body has maintained. An additional compelling reason for the rejection of Sheptyts'kyi's overtures in the winter and spring of 1942 was the incontestible fact that gestures of reconciliation with Rome would have been regarded by many of the Orthodox laity as treason, and would therefore very probably have weakened the church which

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 127–28.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–27.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–30; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 3.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 5, 1942, p. 3; Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 130–31.
[31] Baran, *Mytropolyt*, p. 132.

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participated in such measures. This was a vital consideration, for by midwinter the conflict between the two tendencies in the Orthodox Church represented by Alexius and Polykarp had turned into an active struggle for supremacy.

On December 24, 1941, after the second *sobor* of Volhynian bishops had endowed Alexius with the title of metropolitan, Dionysius appointed Polykarp administrator of all Volhynia. Six weeks later, Archbishop Alexander who, it will be recalled, had been left out of the Autonomous Church conference, joined with the Autocephalous Church in Poland in calling a new *sobor* in Pinsk.[32] While Alexander was not a Ukrainian by origin, he now had a fairly clear title according to Orthodox usage to participate in Ukrainian church affairs, since his archiepiscopal see had been included in the territorial limits of the Ukraine, as defined by the boundaries of the Reichskommissariat. He was a welcome support to the group opposed to Alexius, and they made no difficulty about recognizing his authority to call the *sobor*. Since, however, the other authority for calling the conference was Dionysius, the constitutive assembly of the new Ukrainian church was established by non-Ukrainian prelates. The moving spirits, however, were the strongly nationalist Ukrainians, Polykarp and Hilarion. With them went Palladius, the third Ukrainian bishop of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland. Together they decided to form a new ecclesiastical body to be known as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Ukraïns'ka Avtokefal'na Pravoslavna Tserkva—UAPTs), which was to unite as quickly as possible with the remnants of the church of the same name founded by Lypkivs'kyi.[33] Somewhat later Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk rejected Alexius and adhered to the new group.[34] Their ranks were also augmented by the consecration as bishops in February of two Volhynian priests, Abramovych and Huba, who became members of the hierarchy as Nikanor and Ihor.[35]

[32] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 22, 1942, p. 4.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 22, 1942, p. 4. Apparently Damaskin later returned to the Autonomous Church.
[35] *Ibid.*; and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 28, 1942, p. 1.

795 727 While the basic reason for the foundation of a new church, and its rapid growth at the expense of the body under Alexius, was the nationalist feeling of the Ukrainians, which demanded a fully national church divorced from any connection, however theoretical, with Russia, German policy had also played a role in division of the Orthodox communion. Fundamentally, Nazi policy was permeated with violent hatred of all religion. The guiding principle for selection of German officials for the east ensured that this basic theme would persist in the application of policy: "The whole Christian outlook makes one incapable of carrying on work in the east, for the community of the hymn-book is put ahead of the needs of the Reich."[36] Within this blanket opposition to the church, however, even the fanatical anticlericalism of Rosenberg and his staff permitted compromises to secure tactical advantages. In their eyes, Catholic Christianity was the chief religious danger in the east. The leaders of the Catholic Church had long hoped for an opportunity to bring their doctrines to the peoples of the Soviet Union. On the outbreak of war, they attempted to send a number of priests, including several trained in the Ukrainian College in Rome, as missionaries. The Ostministerium rigorously opposed this endeavor, and with the exception of a few clergymen who were able to penetrate the Ukraine as chaplains in the Italian army, the Vatican's efforts were thwarted.[37] Similarly, the efforts of Polish Catholics to conduct activities in the East Ukraine, even among the considerable body of communicants of the Latin rite in Volhynia, were quickly suppressed.[38]

In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church was not to be opposed openly, provided it was not Russian dominated but Ukrainian in character. Moreover, any other purely Ukrainian sects were to be permitted. It was hoped that by allowing a multitude of religious bodies, the Orthodox Church as such

[36] Memorandum on personnel for the east, from the Rosenberg files, July 9, 1941, PS 1040 (hereafter referred to as PS 1040).

[37] Directive by Alfred Meyer, "Die Frage der konfessionellen Verbände," July 29, 1941, PS 1047 (hereafter referred to as PS 1047). On the training of missionaries of the Greek Catholic rite for missionary work in the USSR after the conquest, see also Aldo Valori, *La Campagna di Russia* (Rome: Grafica Nazionale Editrice, 1951), I, 244.

[38] PS 053.

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would be weakened, for "the corruption and cultural backwardness of the clergy prepared the ground for Bolshevism." [39] When, however, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded as a distinctively national church, it appeared to the Ostministerium to be a useful means of furthering its aim of strengthening Ukrainian nationalism and driving a wedge between the Ukrainian and the Russian elements. Consequently, it felt that the Autocephalous Church under the leadership of Polykarp should be recognized and accorded a position of distinct superiority in comparison to the Autonomous Church headed by Alexius.[40]

As was frequently the case, the policy formulated in Rosenberg's ministry failed of all practical results in the Ukraine. The Reichskommissariat decided to pursue a diametrically opposed course. Thus it proclaimed confessional freedom in June, 1942, but ordered all ecclesiastical organization limited to individual *Generalbezirke*.[41] In particular, it decided a little later to order the dissolution of the governing bodies of both the Autonomous and the Autocephalous Churches, the *sobors* headed by Alexius and Polykarp respectively.[42]

One reason for this decision to restrict religious organization was undoubtedly the fact that the Autocephalous Church had shown great vigor in organizing a new hierarchy. In May a second *sobor* of Autocephalous bishops had gathered in Kiev and consecrated no less than seven new bishops. The majority had been Volhynian priests, but two were laymen who had played prominent roles in the development of the new church body: Stephen Skrypnyk, who became bishop of Pereiaslav as Mstyslav, and a Kiev professor, Haievs'kyi, who became Bishop Sylvester.[43] Strong

[39] PS 1047.

[40] Draft of a directive of Rosenberg to the Reichskommissare Ostland and Ukraine, May 13, 1942, CXLVa 15, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 15). I do not know whether the directive was ever actually sent, but it certainly expresses the opinion of the predominant group in the Ostministerium, as opposed to that of Koch's officials.

[41] Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[42] Directive of Reichskommissar Ukraine (signed by Dargel, head of the political section) to the Generalkommissare, October 1, 1942, CXLVa 20, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 20).

[43] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 28, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup*, July 12, 1942, p. 2.

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795 efforts were made to secure the support of all the surviving Lypkyvites, with great success, apparently because there was no demand for reconsecration, although at first there was friction between the new and the old Autocephalous bodies.[44] The new consecrations raised the total number of the higher clergy to fourteen: two archbishops (Polykarp and Alexander, Hilarion being still a member of the hierarchy of the Polish church, i.e., that in the Generalgouvernement) and twelve bishops, with five hundred parishes and a still greater number of priests under their author-
727 ity.[45] The vigor and unity of the church alone was sufficient to
795 make it repugnant to those Germans who feared any independent center of Ukrainian life. For example, the Generalkommissar in Nikolaev wrote Erich Koch expressing his fear that the Autocephalous Church, which was strong in the northern part of his area, was becoming a "national church," and said that all priests were being closely watched.[46] Koch himself conceived a violent antipathy for Mstyslav, whom he described as "Skrypnyk, a prominent Ukrainian politician in Kiev," asserting that the bishop was trying to turn the Wehrmacht against the Reichskommissariat officials.[47]

As a result of these feelings of distrust, the Reichskommissariat refused to follow the policy of favoring the Autocephalous Church as against the Autonomous Church. With the desertion of the nationalist Ukrainians, the latter was coming more and more to be the confession of Russophile elements in the Ukraine, or at least of those elements which favored equality between Russians and Ukrainians in cultural and political life. In an effort to build up a counterweight to the nationalist forces, the Reichskommissariat officials began to favor the Autonomous Church. First the Reichskommissar decided that a balance should be maintained

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 3; Dmytro Doroshenko in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1.

[45] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 1, 1942, p. 4, based on information from Bishop Mstyslav. Apparently in addition to the bishops I have referred to as adhering to the Autocephalous Church, a new member of the hierarchy, Korenistov, was consecrated as bishop of Brest and auxiliary of Alexander of Pinsk. Doroshenko in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1, also refers to fourteen members of the UAP hierarchy.

[46] April, 1942, CXLVa 474, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 474).

[47] PS 192.

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between the two churches.[48] Later his henchmen used the Autonomous Church as a means of weakening the Autocephalous Church when the latter threatened to become powerful. The reverse tactic was also used occasionally, but the general tendency appears to be that taken by the Stadtkommissar of Kiev, who openly indicated the preference of the German officials for the Russian-oriented church by transferring to it in a public ceremony the principal cathedral of the city, St. Vladimir's (St. Volodymyr's).[49]

The general policy of the Reichskommissariat toward union of the two Orthodox bodies was governed by the same principle of doing everything which would weaken forces which might slip beyond its control. In May, when it appeared that the nascent strength of the Autocephalous group might be curbed by securing its subordination to Alexius, this line of action was favored, though in a tentative way, because the specter of a single united church, whatever its stand on the national question, was also abhorrent to the autocratic Nazi group.[50] By October, when the Autocephalous Church had become so strong that Alexius was obliged to seek unification on terms favorable to it, the Germans intervened to render abortive all attempts at conciliation.[51] Actually, the negotiations between Alexius on the one side and Polykarp, Mstyslav, and Nikanor on the other, proceeded so far that on October 8, 1942, an act of union was signed. A new synod of bishops, consisting of Polykarp and Alexius as metropolitans, with Alexander, Simon (an Autonomous bishop) and Nikanor as members, and Mstyslav as secretary, was to be formed. Thus the Autocephalous group would have obtained a clear majority in the directing body. The episcopal sees were to be so rearranged as to allow places for all or most of the bishops hitherto consecrated by both groups.[52] The strong German inter-

[48] CXLVa 20.

[49] *Volyn'*, May 2, 1943, p. 4.

[50] On May 4, 1942, at a conference in Rovno, an official of the Reichskommissariat expressed the wishes of the German authorities that the two churches unite, but declared that the Germans would maintain neutrality and not intervene at that time to secure union (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 14, 1942, p. 3).

[51] The directive of the Reichskommissar Ukraine to the Generalkommissare previously cited (CXLVa 20) provided that all efforts at union should be opposed.

[52] *Nastup*, November 15, 1942, p. 2; *Ukraïns'ka Diïmist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

727 vention, however, combined with the opposition of a number
795 of Autonomous bishops, headed by Panteleimon, forced Alexius to retract his signature.[53]

795 From what has just been said, one would assume that there
668* would be a close connection between the Autocephalous Church, which within a few months had come to be the church of most believing Ukrainian nationalists, and the nationalist parties. To a certain extent this is true, for many members of the latter, who were prevented by the danger of violent death from pursuing any national political activities, turned to the cultivation of the church as a means for expressing and propagating their feelings. A number of the leading members of the Autocephalous Church were affiliated with the UNR, and the Het'man group also displayed great interest in religious development, in line with its conservative and traditionalist principles. More particularly, Mstyslav, the member of the UAP hierarchy who was most intimately acquainted with and interested in political affairs, was an old adherent of the UNR.[54]

668* As has been previously indicated, however, the really active parties in the East Ukraine were the two factions of the OUN. Hence the fact that the church leaders tended to associate with other groupings acted as a certain impediment to close collaboration. Moreover, a strong element in both wings of the OUN was opposed to religion in principle. This ideological bias against utilizing the church as a major instrument of national expression was undoubtedly given greatly increased weight by the experience
668* of the nationalists in the East Ukraine. The churches—both Au-
771 tonomous and Autocephalous—had no difficulty in attracting communicants, for there were many millions who had longed for the remembered solace of religion throughout the years of Communist oppression. These adherents of the church were, however, drawn very largely from the lower classes, the less educated elements of the population, especially the peasantry.[55] Since the OUN groups—as will be shown—concentrated their efforts on the intelligentsia, they placed comparatively little emphasis on

[53] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, December 10, 1942. p. 2.

[54] Interview 69.

[55] See Chapter IX for details and sources on the attitude of the social classes and age groups toward religion.

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aspects of nationalist feeling which were prevalent only in the village. More important, the younger generation everywhere, even in the rural areas, was hostile or at least indifferent to religion. Both OUN groups were intent upon winning the allegiance of youth; they soon came to see that any close connection with the church would be interpreted by a large segment of the latter as "reactionary." Hence they abandoned or played down their contacts with the clergy, rather than jeopardize their success with the youth.[56]

While the factors just described prevented any wholehearted collaboration between the church and the nationalist political movements, there were numerous cases in which the two nationalist tendencies moved in parallel paths. This was especially the case in Kiev, where Panteleimon, the most outspokenly pro-Russian of Autonomous bishops, and hence the most obstinate foe of Ukrainian national independence, was opposed to Mstyslav, the most active nationalist among the Autocephalous bishops. Nationalist Ukrainians abstained from any contact with the Autonomous Church there; they had the support of a number of prominent figures in the city administration, including the mayor, Forostivs'kyi, who had himself been a priest under Lypkyvs'kyi. The anti-Nationalist element around Shtepa and Bohatyrchuk was perhaps not so enthusiastic about Panteleimon's church, and appears to have maintained a modicum of good relations with the Autocephalous clergy, but in general the alignment of political groups closely corresponded to confessional differences.[57]

This was even more the case in Dniepropetrovsk, where a strong proponent of a revived Russian Empire, Dimitrius, was installed as Autonomous bishop. The nationalist elements were violently opposed to his policies, and apparently considerable popular opposition was awakened by his efforts to revive the pomp of the old Russian Orthodox Church.[58] On the other hand, strong Russian nationalist elements, encouraged in all likelihood by the strongly Russophile city administration and press, vigor-

[56] Interviews 18, 65, 76.

[57] Interview 19.

[58] Interview 18 supported the statement in *Nastup*, August 22, 1942, that about thirty churches in the Dniepropetrovsk area joined the UAP church when a bishop was named by it for Dniepropetrovsk.

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795 668* ously supported Dimitrius. This support resulted in several cases of actual vandalism directed against rival churches. The leader of the Autocephalous Church, Genadius, enjoyed good relations with both Mel'nyk and Bandera groups in the Dnieper city. Genadius aided the Bandera underground workers to escape from the German authorities, while one of his principal assistants was affiliated with the OUN-M, and the university faculty, which was strongly influenced by the Mel'nyk group, taught courses to prepare aspirants for his clergy.[59]

It is necessary to stress the extent—and the limits—of collaboration between the nationalists and the Autocephalous Church because of two incidents which have been widely taken as proof that the latter institution was involved, to an extent that could hardly be compatible with Christian principles, with some of the more violent elements of the OUN. The first incident concerned the head of the Autonomous Church, Archbishop Alexius. Early in the morning of May 7, 1943, the prelate started on a trip from his monastery near Kremenets.[60] He was in a German vehicle, part of a small convoy; why he chose this means of transportation is unclear, but it seems likely that the Germans would have urged a man of his prestige to accept such an accommodation, for as will be remembered the Volhynian roads at this time were in danger of attack from Red partisan bands or from nationalist bands disguised as such. At eight o'clock, as the little convoy was passing through a wood, it was suddenly attacked by a section of "Khrin's" partisan group; in the volley of shots, the occupants of the archbishop's automobile were all killed, and the wrecked vehicle was seized by the partisans. They were shocked to discover the prominent clergyman in a group which they thought included only German officials. Afterwards, however, they asserted that their remorse was dissipated by the finding of papers indicating close collaboration between the archbishop and the German police.[61]

If the above account, which appears to be highly probable, is

[59] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 19, 1942, p. 2; Interview 18.
[60] *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[61] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, June 1, 1943, p. 2; Baran, *Mytropolyt*, p. 122; Interview 12.

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true, it is certain that the killing was unintentional and unpremeditated and consequently does not indicate any plan of the nationalists to aid the Autocephalous Church by destroying the chief prelate of the opposing group. That such a plan is even more unlikely is shown by the fact, attested by a source not involved in the dispute, that Alexius was the chief moderating influence in the Autonomous Church.[62] As has been shown, he tried to bring about union, and was on terms of friendship with at least one of the chief Autocephalous churchmen. These circumstances also go far to refute the charge that Alexius was in the service of the German police or, as has also been alleged by nationalist writers, in the service of the NKVD.[63] His personal character, as evidenced by his writings,[64] and the respect in which he was held even by opponents militate against such an accusation, even had not his conciliatory tendency refuted the main burden of the charge that he had fostered the disruption of the church to further the ends of the Germans and the Soviets. The whole incident was in all probability a tragic accident, utilized afterwards as propaganda for the rival groups.

So clear-cut a judgment cannot be offered concerning the second incident involving the slaying of an Autonomous bishop. In the late summer of 1943, Emmanuel, then Autonomous bishop of Vladimir Volynsk, was seized by a band of the UPA (controlled at that time by the OUN-B), taken to one of their forest headquarters, and there, after a "trial," executed as a traitor and a spy. Charges similar to those made against Alexius were the basis for the accusation against his colleague, and, in addition, Emmanuel is supposed to have confessed to having acted as an agent for the German police in betraying underground members.[65] Whether this is true cannot be determined, but certain factors cast considerable doubt upon it. The fact that the same charges were made against Alexius, who was very likely innocent, renders suspicious the accusations made against Emmanuel. The latter

[62] CXLVa 66.
[63] Mykola Selez', "Iak diiut stalins'ki agentury?" (How Do the Stalinist Agent Systems Operate?), *Vpered*, May, 1949, p. 11.
[64] See his letter to Sheptyts'kyi in Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 128–30.
[65] Selez', p. 11; Interview 63.

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687 668* 795 was regarded, for another reason, as a traitor, for he had originally been consecrated as bishop of Belaia Tserkov' by the Autocephalous Church, and his subsequent defection to the Autonomous Church, on grounds of the dubious canonical validity of the nationalist religious body, must have been a sore blow to Ukrainian nationalist feeling.[66] He had also issued public statements calling for all the faithful to avoid aiding the nationalist partisans; while nearly everyone in a public position in Volhynia (including an OUN member like the editor of *Volyn'*) was forced to make such statements, it appears likely that Emmanuel may have been rather more vigorous and sincere than others in his circumstances.[67] On the other hand, there is no really trustworthy evidence that he engaged in spying, or other indisputably dishonorable activity, and those who knew him best tend to doubt the charge.[68] Consequently, it appears that his death was due to the fanatic and ruthless spirit which dominated the OUN-B in Volhynia at the time.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to implicate the Autocephalous Church in his killing, and all appearances point to its having been decided upon independently by the partisan forces. It is true that Emmanuel's position was especially distasteful to the UPA because of the contrast it offered to the stand of the most active Autocephalous prelate in Volhynia, Bishop Platonius of Rovno, who actively aided the underground, and is said even to have gone to the UPA camp in Derman to offer his support.[69] It should be pointed out, however, that Platonius was comparatively uninfluential in Autocephalous Church councils. The more typical attitude was that of Polykarp—also resident in Volhynia—who offered vigorous protests against German attacks on the clergy and against the brutal treatment of his people,[70] yet never gave open support or encouragement to the rebels. In this policy of submission to the secular power, even to an evil one, Polykarp

[66] Selez', p. 11; *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[67] Cf. his address to the Ukrainian population, in *Volyn'*, August 8, 1943, p. 3.
[68] Interview 38.
[69] *UAPTs*, p. 10; Interview 18.
[70] CXLVa 66. See also the sharp but respectful protest of Hilarion against the shooting of Autocephalous priests in the Generalgouvernement for contacts with escaped prisoners of war in the spring of 1942—long before there was any widespread nationalist partisan activity (Occ E-2 [2]).

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was, according to his own statement, following the tradition of Orthodoxy.[71]

A few months after the tragic episodes just described, nearly all of the East Ukraine was reconquered by the Red Army. The great majority of the Orthodox bishops, of both the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups, did not await the vengeance which could be expected to follow their opposition to the Soviet plan for using Orthodoxy as a propaganda weapon but fled to the Generalgouvernement. Here they were given considerably more courteous treatment than had been their lot in the Reichskommissariat.[72] Moreover, the Ostministerium felt able at last to push forward its plans for formation of a national church. The project envisaged by Rosenberg's ministry called for union of the two rival branches. Ostensibly this union would have been a compromise, but, like the abortive agreement signed by Alexius, it would have favored the Autocephalous group. The Ostministerium officials in charge of the negotiations were obviously sympathetic to Mstyslav and Hilarion, though somewhat cooler toward Polykarp.[73] On the other hand, they viewed Panteleimon, the real leader of the Autonomous group, as a "Russian" and obstinate; they proposed to induce him to leave the Ukraine altogether by offering him the vacant Orthodox see of Riga.[74] The Autocephalous desire for a union in which there would be for a time "Russian bishops for the Russian minority," who would later be absorbed into the "Ukrainian church," obviously envisaged a relegation of the Autonomous bishops, or at least of those who persisted in favoring Russian cultural and ethnic elements, to an inferior position, yet it was apparently not opposed by the Ostministerium.[75]

[71] CXLVa 66.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] *Ibid.* The nominal leader of the Autonomous Church, elected to succeed Alexius, was Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk, who appears by this time to have returned to the Autonomous fold (cf. *Volyn'*, July 1, 1943, p. 3).

[75] CXLVa 66. Although this project could not be carried out, the Ostministerium continued to favor to the limit of its capacities the Ukrainian national group in religious as well as political affairs. Cf. Memorandum of Rosenfelder (specialist in the Ostministerium) to Chef des Führungstabes Politik, December 14, 1944, concerning plans for increasing the influence of the Autocephalous Church among

795 The plans for a nationalist church were frustrated, however, by the refusal of the Autonomous bishops to accept the role assigned them by the Ostministerium and by the impotency of the latter agency to enforce its wishes. Instead of uniting with the other bishops from the Ukraine, the surviving Autonomous hierarchs adhered to the émigré Russian Orthodox Church represented by the Karlovtsi Synod. At least two of them had done so by the beginning of October, 1944, and the remainder soon followed.[76] The coincidence of these steps with the adherence of certain prominent Ukrainians to the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia suggests that the same German forces which encouraged the Vlasov movement may also have supported the decision of the church group. The fact that such a step was taken, however, confirms the appraisal of the Autonomous Church as an organization closely linked to those elements which desired the continuance and the prevalence of Russian culture in the Ukraine and the maintenance of political ties with Russia.

795 668* The organization, tactics, and specific objectives of the Autocephalous Church were distinct from those of the nationalist parties during the war period. The very concept of an independent Ukrainian church served to promote a feeling of Ukrainian national distinctiveness, however, and since the Autocephalous clergy were usually propagators of nationalism, no consideration of the nationalist movements in the Orthodox East Ukraine under German occupation which failed to take into account the role of 795 the Autocephalous Church would be complete. Since the rival

the *Ostarbeiter* at the expense of the Russian Orthodox Church, CXLVa 76, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 76).

[76] Rosenfelder to Chef des Führungsstabes Politik, October 4, 1944, CXLVa 74, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 74); *UAPTs*, p. 6. At least one Autocephalous and three Autonomous bishops remained behind when the Red Army reoccupied the East Ukraine. Two of the former Autonomous bishops, Anthony (Martsenko) and Hiob (Kresovych), were apparently permitted to exercise episcopal functions under Soviet rule. Cf. Wassilij Alexeev, *Russian Orthodox Bishops in the Soviet Union, 1941–1953: Materials for the History of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR* (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), pp. 134 ff. (mimeographed, with Russian language text).

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Autonomous Church sought to maintain ties with Moscow, it is especially illuminating to compare its influence with that of the nationalist church. Consequently, the activities of the two rival churches will be noted frequently in the following chapters on the East Ukraine.[77]

[77] An important recent work on the church in the Ukraine, Friedrich Heyer's *Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945* (Köln-Braunsfeld: Verlagsgesellschaft Rudolf Müller, 1953), reached me too late for notice in the body of this study. Heyer, who served with the Wehrmacht in the occupied Soviet Union during the Second World War, had numerous personal contacts with leaders of both the Autonomous Church and the Autocephalous Church; in addition, he has apparently been able to utilize notes or other documents concerning ecclesiastical affairs acquired in the course of his military service. In general, his account of church developments corresponds to that which I have given above and in succeeding chapters, and his conclusions are similar except that he ascribes somewhat greater success to the Autonomous Church. While much of his discussion of the wartime period is devoted to purely ecclesiastical affairs which I did not attempt to cover in detail, his work is extremely valuable from the political and sociological standpoint as well. Particularly interesting are his abundant details on the extent of reorganization of religious life in the occupied territories, and his comments on the response of the population to the efforts of the churches.

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IX. CHANNELS OF NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

[795] 668* THOUGH the church did in some measure provide an institutional framework through which nationalist sentiment could be expressed, its usefulness for the propagation of a political doctrine was necessarily limited. Such organizational channels were essential to the nationalist movements if they were to achieve large-scale results in the occupied East Ukraine. To be sure, the underground parties themselves provided a network of contacts and a minimum of central direction. In comparison with the vast area to be covered—populated in 1941–43, even after wartime dislocations, by thirty millions—resources under their direct control [208] were microscopic. Clandestine publications could be issued by mimeograph machines or small hand presses and circulated from one trusted individual to another. Such propaganda could, however, reach only a few thousand. As underground groups, the nationalist parties necessarily had extremely small memberships. For example, a group of twelve members of the OUN-B in Kramatorskaia (Kremators'ka) in the Donbas is referred to by one of the leaders of the party in that area as a "big" cell.[1] Again, the entire number of active OUN-M workers in Kiev in late 1942 never exceeded thirty.[2] It is certain that the members of each of the OUN organizations in the chief cities after early 1942 could be counted in dozens and that the total number of active workers in the East Ukraine numbered only a few hundred.

For a conspiratorial organization, however, the number of members is not necessarily a criterion of effectiveness. By infiltrating key positions in public institutions, the nationalist parties might obtain influence out of all proportion to the number of their adherents. Moreover, even when centrally organized parties like

[1] Interview 66.
[2] Interview 65. p 210

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186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.
[39] PS 1693.
[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.
[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

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III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(A) Religious

(*a*) *Christians.*—Prince Vladimir of Kiev (972–1015) accepted Christianity in its Byzantine form. The first Bishop of Kiev, Michael, a Syrian by birth, was sent by the Patriarch of Constantinople, on whom Kiev was dependent. After the final separation of the Eastern and Western Churches in 1054, the Church of Kiev kept up relations with the Pope for nearly a hundred years. Eventually, however, owing to the influence of Nicephorus, a Greek by birth, who was Metropolitan of Kiev, 1104–20, it followed Constantinople. After the Ukraine passed under Lithuanian and Polish rule, her church history became independent of that of the Great Russian Church. In 1354 the Patriarch of Constantinople appointed Alexis, a Russian by birth, as Metropolitan of Moscow; and in 1362, complying with the request of the Lithuanian prince (a pagan), he appointed another Metropolitan in Kiev for those Ukrainians who were subjects of Lithuania.

The idea of a Graeco-Roman national Church had been occasionally entertained in Western Ukraine; and in 1594 a Synod of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops, led by Rahosa the Metropolitan of Kiev, laid the foundation of the 'Uniat' Church, i. e. a Church of Byzantine ritual and Slavonic language, recognizing the jurisdiction of the Pope. The movement had a double character—national, for it originated with educated and patriotic clergy; and moral, for it aimed at improving the character of the clergy. The Synod of Brest in 1595–6 proclaimed the Union, which was supported by most of the Orthodox bishops, the bishops of Lvov and Przemysl being the last to join it. From the very beginning the Union had to face opposition on the one hand from the educated Ukrainian laymen,

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● 795 led by Prince Constantine Ostrogski and the Cossacks, and on the other hand from the Polish Catholic bishops, who did not wish to recognize the Uniat bishops as their equals in rights. On the demand of the Orthodox part of the Ukraine, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanus, ordained new bishops for the Ukraine to take the place of those who had joined the Uniat Church. At first these were not accepted by the Polish kings; but, under the pressure of Cossack demands, Ladislaus IV divided the bishoprics of the Ukraine between the Uniats and the Orthodox. The Orthodox bishops were installed in Przemysl, Lvov, and Lutsk. In their opposition to the Uniat Church, the Cossacks united with the Russians.

795 798 At the Polish Partition of 1795, all the sees were Uniat except Lvov and Przemysl, and there were about 12,000,000 professing Uniats. In spite of the fact that all treaties between Poland and Russia (1773, 1775, 1788, 1793, 1795) had expressly guaranteed the toleration of Catholics of both rites, the persecution of Uniats by Russia began almost at once. In 1827 the four Uniat bishoprics of Vilna, Brest, Polotsk, and Lutsk were made into two, the Lithuanian and White Russian. In 1833 forcible conversion was introduced; and in 1839 a sham petition was addressed to the Russian Government by a Uniat priest, Joseph Siemaszko, asking that the Uniat Church should be restored to communion with the State religion. Wholesale massacres and banishments to Siberia began; the last Uniat Bishop of Cholm, Kalinski, was exiled, and a Galician apostate, Popiel, was installed in his place. In 1875 the Union was officially suppressed.

The attitude of the Poles to the Union was changed after the Polish Partitions. The Catholic clergy and people in Russian Poland supported the Uniats in their refusal to attend the Orthodox Church; the Uniats were officially known as 'non-Christians', though unofficially their spiritual needs were attended to by the Uniat or Catholic clergy. The Uniat Church in Galicia supported their countrymen across the

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

frontier. After the proclamation of religious toleration in 1905, about 200,000 Ukrainians immediately declared themselves Uniats, so that the Russian Government soon found it necessary to restrict the scope of the proclamation. Though the Uniats in Russia were forbidden to join the Catholic Church, many of them became Catholics or sectaries. The last Russian persecution of the Uniat Church took place during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1915, when the Russian bishop, Eulogius, started a regular campaign to replace Uniat priests by Orthodox clergy, and Uniat Ukrainian by Russian Orthodox schools. Many Uniat priests were banished to Siberia; and the Uniat Metropolitan, Szeptycki, was exiled to a Russian monastic prison. It is uncertain whether the Uniat Church has been gaining ground outside the provinces of Chołm and Polesia. As no statistics have been taken in Russia since the decree of religious toleration in 1905, it is difficult to give a correct estimate of the number of members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but their percentage varies from 75 to 93 in the various Governments of the Russian Ukraine. The Great-Russian sect of the *Raskolniki* (Old Believers) found refuge in the Governments of Kharkov (0·1 per cent. of the population) and Chernigov (0·9 per cent.).

The number of Roman Catholics, chiefly Poles, is higher in the west (in Volhynia the Poles in 1897 formed 6·16 per cent. of the population), but they are only slightly more numerous than the Lutheran Protestants (in Volhynia 5·73 of the population), who are German colonists.

Of great social importance are the peasant sects, of which the chief in the Ukraine is the *Shtunda* (from *Stunde*, since they gather at a definite hour). The doctrines of this Lutheran sect, which originated in Württemberg in 1705, were brought to South Russia by the Württemberg merchants, as the Danzig merchants, who came here after the partitions of Poland, brought with them the teaching of the Mennonite sect. Since 1870 it has been oppressed officially by the Russian

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Cholm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
[554] life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia*. The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia*.

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.); also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic.

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.;

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Yekaterinoslav, 5 per cent.; Poltava, 4 per cent.; Taurida, 4 per cent.; Kharkov, 0·5 per cent. only.

Like the Orthodox Church, the Jewish community has its sects. There are two such sects in the Ukraine; and their members exercise a great moral influence, and form a bridge between the Turkish and Jewish populations of the Ukraine. They are called Karaimy and Krymchaki, and live chiefly in the towns of the Taurida and Kherson Governments. They number about 12,000. These people, using mostly Tatar dialects, are supposed to be descendants of Jewish pre-Christian colonies in the Crimea and the Turkic Khazars of the Middle Ages, who were of Jewish faith. The Karaimy disapprove of the Talmud, and base all their beliefs on the Law of Moses. They differ from other Jewish communities in their cleanliness, their absolute honesty in business, and their great sense of social duties. Hence their wealth is evenly distributed in their communities.

(*c*) *Mohammedans.*—The largest Mohammedan colony is found in the Taurida government (187,940, or 13 per cent.), but their schools are less efficient and their culture is much lower than that of the Mohammedans of the Volga or of Turkestan.

(B) Educational

The last census, taken in 1897,[1] gives the following figures:

Name of Government.	*Total population in 1,000's.*	*No. of literates in 1,000's.*	*Per cent. of literates.*
Podolia . .	3,018	450	14·5
Kharkov . .	2,492	384	15·4
Poltava . .	2,778	446	16·1
Volhynia . .	2,989	493	16·5
Kiev . . .	3,559	598	16·8
Chernigov . .	2,298	402	17·5
Yekaterinoslav .	2,114	433	20·5
Kherson . .	2,734	657	24·1
Taurida . .	1,448	380	26·2
	23,430	4,243	average 18·2

[1] From *The Ukrainian Movement as a Stage in South Russian Separatism*, Shchegolev (Kiev, 1912), p. 364.

798 collapse seemed inevitable when in 1595 seven Orthodox bishops had approved the Brest Union in principle. But Polish-Jesuit intolerance, unfulfilled promises and disregard of the rights of those who were ready to enter the union made some of the bishops mistrustful and again estranged them. The arrogance with which the Catholic party treated the Orthodox, their public mockery, indeed even maltreatment of the Orthodox priests at that time, caused a chasm so great that to this day it has not been bridged over. At the same time, those who were already Uniats were not much better off. Their "complete equality" with Polish citizens and the Catholic clergy remained an empty promise which it was not in the power of the Uniat bishops to enforce. If the lower priests did not belong to the nobility "they were often seen in torn clothing walking along, whip in hand, beside their horses and oxen, furnishing relays for the state or performing compulsory services as serfs to their master." (57)

57. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 24.

Conditions in the Uniat church improved in those regions that had come under Austrian rule after the partitioning of Poland, whereas in congressional Poland a ukase of the Czar again forcefully opened up the Orthodox heaven to the Uniats. With Peter the Great, who in 1721 had transferred the rights of the patriarchy of Moscow to the Holy Synod, the Czar had become the head of the Orthodox Church.

184 795 Since the serious crisis of Orthodoxy in the 15th and 16th /107/ century, the opportunity for a reunion of both churches* has never been as favorable as it is at present. The "defender of all Orthodox believers" is dead. The Synod in Moscow as well as the Ukrainian church, which

*[i.e., Catholic-Orthodox - Analyst]

194 795 became autocephalous during the Revolution, have dissolved. In the wide realm of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there is no visible ecclesiastical authority whatsoever. No one knows how many priests are secretly carrying on their duties. Churches are closed and have been transformed into "godless museums" or clubs. East Rome is without power and without priests.

648 795 It was said of Pius XI: "The Holy Father is much concerned about the re-unification of the East. It may be said that he has made this the goal of his life." (58) Pius XII, as may be

58. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 38.

seen by the honor bestowed on Vladimir, cherishes the same plans.

But the Soviet Union remained closed to the emissaries of the Vatican. Everything was done that could be done. In 1918 the Vatican hastened to send an ambassador to Kiyev. But before he arrived the addressee of the credentials, Hetman Skoropadsky, was already fleeing to the West. In 1922 to 1923 papal aid to the starving is supposed to "prepare the ground" for the seed which none other but Nuntius Pacelli scattered when in all secrecy in Berlin, he consecrated a Jesuit organizer as bishop of this charitable work; the Jesuit who is passing through must be consecrated secretly, in order that the Bolsheviks do not become suspicious and that the "simple" father who is apparently only concerned about apportioning the food that is handed out, can unostentatiously appoint five bishops. In this manner the first Catholic prelates are installed in the Ukraine. How often they have made use of their sacred powers and how many Catholic bishops and priests there are today in Soviet Ukraine is not known even in the Vatican.

Vatican.

000 Many hundreds of Catholic priests trained in the Orthodox ritual are waiting for the moment when the frontiers of the Soviet Union will be opened to the missionaries of Rome. /108/ They have been educated in the numerous special seminaries for priests which were erected at the wish of Pius XI in many dioceses of various countries.

First of all, however, the Orthodox of Poland were to be converted, of which, according to the last census, there were 3.8 million. The overwhelming majority of them were Greek Orthodox after the Brest Union and before their adoption into the Russian Empire. Now they were to be united anew with the Roman-Catholic Church, not all at once, by force or from above through the conversion of bishops, but gradually and from below by winning over laymen and the priests. Pius XI who was for many years nuncio in Warsaw and got along well with the Poles, used for this purpose a more recent ritual, the Byzantine-Slavic one, which is more nearly like the purely Orthodox than is the Greek Orthodox, known as Ruthenian in Rome. Externally the Byzantine-Slavic priests with their long beards, their long hair and the klobuk (priest's hat) resemble their Orthodox colleagues. The dogma of this evolving church has not been definitively established. The Roman ecclesiastical congregation of the East is still uncertainly feeling its way along this difficult terrain. The orthodox love the form and even more the profound mysticism of their service which is rich in symbolism. The Vatican has learned from previous mistakes; it does not want to be hasty and arouse distrust. It is necessary to tread softly in places where the figures of saints are shunned as idols and demons and where the pope is regarded as the personified Antichrist. The fathers of the Byzantine-Slavic ritual are open to reason in matters of dogma, but the pope must

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be recognized as the supreme shepherd and as infallible in ecclesiastical matters. This is their first condition. The dogma grows shaky on the doctrine about purgatory. The Orthodox Church knows only heaven and hell; and it is not always easy - in spite of the comforting prospect - to convince laymen and priests who are willing to be converted that there is also a purgatory./109/ The question as to whether the new ritual could not get along without this place of purification is at present still being considered in Rome. The problem of the origin of the Holy Spirit who, according to the Roman-Catholic conception forms a unity with God the Father and the Son, and according to the Orthodox belief originates only in God the Father, causes the least difficulties. The Byzantine-Slavic ritual is here permitted to adopt the Orthodox dogma.

Even though the 2000-year-old Roman Church had time carefully to prepare the matter of union, this was not the case with the fast-moving Polish state. Since Misika, a contemporary of Vladimir, introduced West Roman Christianity into Poland, the latter has always been at a disadvantage in its battle over the countries of the Slavic peoples with Orthodox religion, and it has always tried to compensate for this defect by Catholisizing in a headlong fashion. Polish missionary methods have done more harm than good as far as the Vatican is concerned. More than once the Papal See was obliged to curb Polish nationalism; four papal decress forbid the conversion of members of the Union to the Roman Catholic faith. In spite of this the Poles blithely went on "converting".

The most recent attempts at union by Pius XI and Pius XII were from the beginning sorely impeded by the preference shown the Poles by the deceased pope. Pius XI who gave Byzantine-Slavic ritual a new impulse excluded the Greek-Catholic clergy of Galicia, that is to say the Ukrainian priests, from their work of converting their

745 brothers in Volhynia, in Lublin, in Polesia and 748 in Podlakhia. He placed the clergy of the growing church under the jurisdiction of Polish Roman-Catholic bishops. Instead of Ukrainian priests, the French, Dutch and Poles, Redemptorists, Jesuits and Polish secular priests began missionary work in the Ukraine. It was supervised by an apostolic inspector who could pronounce no ecclesiastical judgment. The seminary for priests in Dubno was directed by Jesuits. /110/ But the thing that embittered all Ukrainians, whether Orthodox or Uniat, most of all against Rome, was the way the Orthodox Ukrainian ecclesiastical possessions seized by Warsaw were wasted on the Poles. The long fight between Ukrainian and Polish clergy about this property was settled by Pius XI in favor of the weaker party. Polish pastors received Ukrainian prebends and Polish colonists 100,000 hectares of land. The metropolitan of Lwów in a pastoral letter which was confiscated, described the papal procedure with regard to Poland as "robbery".

It cannot be denied that the Poles carried on a clever ecclesiastical policy toward the Vatican. Their strongest pressure instrument was probably the autocephalous Polish Church with Russian hierarchy which was subject to the Byzantine patriarch. A separate Orthodox faculty had been provided for it at the Warsaw University. In this way the Papal See could be threatened and its plans thwarted without incurring punishment.

The violent Catholisizing actions of the Poles, known as the "revindication of souls" made the Roman efforts at union extremely difficult. In the process of Polonizing Orthodox Ukrainians, the churches were often the only obstacle that needed to be taken seriously, for where the cultured stratum of society was so thin, the pope and the church were the only national prop the people had.

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The removal of this national stronghold has been systematically carried on for many years by the Poles through methods which could probably be compared with those of the "revindication" of Catherine II.

As early as 1928 the Warsaw government closed approximately 400 Orthodox churches and liquidated the church property belonging to them. The "Ukrainian Self Reliance League of Canada" in a petition to the League of Nations asserted that by closing the Orthodox churches or by transferring them to the Roman Catholic Church "the members of the Greek Orthodox Church are deprived of the right of free /111/ exercise of their religion". The Poles dropped the last controls in the summer of 1938. They banished the few Ukrainian intellectuals from the border region; mounted corps of frontier guards with army chaplains at their head entered the Orthodox villages and a few hours later left the communities which had now become "converted" to Rome. Finally, Warsaw also carried on its missionary work with powder and quickmatch. About this the confiscated "Kuryer Wilenski" of August 26, 1938 reports among other things: "The destruction in the past month of a hundred and more Orthodox churches in the eastern districts of the voivodeship of Lublin at the command of the administrative bodies produced, as we know, first a reaction on the part of the bishop's council of the Orthodox Church in Poland and then also a reaction of the head of the Greek Uniat Church in the form of a manifesto to all believers, as well as incitement of the population in a few towns in which these 'riots' occurred... The Greek Orthodox clergy maintains that in the voivodeship of Lublin 114 Orthodox churches were destroyed by order of the authorities... It cannot be denied that people of the Greek Orthodox faith were profoundly stirred by the fact that their sanctuaries were destroyed."

11:Obermaier--116 J-3(no date)1942 RDlUkraineRDl

TAS 148

This is a picture of the beginning of the new Union.

/112/ Moscow Educates

000 In one thing Lenin proved superior to his enemies and predecessors: he knew how to utilize the social-revolutionary and nationalist-revolutionary forces in the vast Russian Empire for his own ends. With the explosive material which Hetman Skoropadskyj and the counterrevolutionary general Denikin had piled up anew through their forcible restoration of large estates, he destroyed both opponents. He met the collapse of the idea of a Pan-Russian Empire with the slogan of the revolutionary proletarian unified front of non-Russian peoples of the former czarist realm against the capitalist states. It was only for appearances' sake that he complied with the national wishes of the peoples gathered together under Moscow.

668 In Russian Ukraine, where at the beginning of the Revolution the national consciousness of the great masses of peasants was not yet deeply rooted, Lenin's tactics did not run against insuperable difficulties. The cultured stratum, already not too large, was divided into two camps, one of which sympathized with Bolshevism, while the other regarded an autonomy within the democratic realm of Great Russia as the most favorable solution of the problem of nationalities. Thus from the beginning Lenin had a part of the Ukrainian people on his side, and he subjugated the rest with the help of Muscovite troops during years of bloody civil wars. True, in November 1917, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" sovereign rights "including the right of severance and of formation of an independent state" /113/ were promised, but toward the end of the period of the Communist war there was no force left which might have made use of it.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

UK. 668 which had existed in Ukraine proper, and the Western Ukrainian, quite understandably, never felt that he owed anything to Russia and to the Russians. This mentality of the Western Ukrainian, who had outspoken leanings towards independence, was bound to create considerable difficulties inside the Soviet Ukraine.

The Soviet Government set itself the task of counteracting the recalcitrant Western Ukrainian spirit and of levelling out the differences existing between the 'liberated Western Ukraine' and the rest of the Ukraine in the cultural, economic and political sphere.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE UNIATE CHURCH

UK. 795 S.U. 795 After the liquidation of all openly anti-Bolshevik movements in the Western Ukraine and the annihilation of the 'class enemy' in the form of the bourgeoisie and the 'kulaks', there still remained for subjection to the 'levelling-out process' one important bulwark of Westernism: the Uniate Church with over 3,500,000 followers in Eastern Galicia and several hundred thousand in the Bukovina and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Uniate Church had come into existence at the end of the sixteenth century in the interest and under the influence of the Polish State. As time went on the Uniate Church developed into something more than the artificial creation of a ruling caste. It was, in the end, the true expression of an area which is neither West nor East since the Uniate Church combined Eastern rites with a Western cultural and ecclesiastical orientation symbolized by the recognition of the Roman Pope.

S.U. [175] The struggle between Poland and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though essentially a political one, was largely conducted under the cloak of religious differences. Russia claimed that her aim was to emancipate the Orthodox population of Eastern Poland from 'temptation and humiliation' by the Poles. To push back the influence of the 'Polish' Roman Catholic Church and to carry out the liquidation of the Uniate Church were thus major objectives which Russia pursued in the three partitions of Poland. The Empress Catherine II proclaimed in 1794 that resistance to the reunion of Uniates and Roman Catholics with the Orthodox Church in the territories conquered from the Poles was a criminal offence; and thus about 2,000,000 Roman Catholics and Uniates were 'persuaded' to embrace the Orthodox Church of their ancestors in the course of a few weeks. A church council of the Uniates held in Polotsk in Byelorussia (White Russia) in 1839 brought 1,500,000 Uniates together with their bishops back into the fold of Orthodoxy. In 1874 the last Uniate diocese of Kholm was abolished and 500,000 Uniates willy-nilly transformed into Orthodox congregations.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church.

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken.

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.[17]

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism.

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman